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Social Injustice in Minor League Baseball: 
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“[It is] very much like the indentured servitude of the 1700‟s. 
When you first sign, you are owned by that team for basically 7 
seasons. A team can buy you, sell you, send you to another 
country, or fire you whenever they want. They can cut you if you 
get hurt. A player, on the other hand, cannot try to play for 
someone else. He can [not] try out for his home team. You have 
to play for the team that drafted you even if they are loaded at 
your position. . . [T]his obsession with making the majors should 
not be a justification for the current treatment of minor league 
players, and I certainly hope it would not be used as an excuse to 
give major league and minor league owners a legal blank 
check.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution bars any law 
from impairing the obligations of contracts.
2
 There are minimal 
restraints, including minimum wage, antidiscrimination, antitrust, and 
competition laws, to this freedom of contract guaranteed by the 
constitution. However, Major League Baseball (―MLB‖) by availing 
itself of a century-old antitrust exemption has continuously found a way 
to circumvent even these restraints and create one of the biggest 
monopolies this country has ever seen. 
In the last twenty to thirty years, the industry of professional sports 
has become one of the biggest businesses in the world. In so doing, the 
commissioners of the leagues into which most sports are organized have 
had to become savvy businessmen with one ultimate goal: to maximize 
profits. The simplest way for professional sports to maximize profits is to 
decrease the supply of the product, while at the same time increasing the 
demand for it. MLB has done a sensational job of this. Throughout the 
last century, reaching the majors has become the ultimate goal of any 
baseball player with little to no competition from opposing leagues. 
MLB has become the American dream, so to speak, for any young 
ballplayer: if you work hard enough you can make millions of dollars by 
simply playing baseball. But while this is true for some, it is not the case 
                                                                                                             
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
2015] SOCIAL INJUSTICE IN MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 141 
 
for most players. Exploiting this pipe dream, MLB has been able to all 
but eliminate freedom of contract between the league and its players. 
This note will study how MLB‘s antitrust exemption has allowed 
MLB to violate federal laws and exploit its employees. First, in Part I, 
this note will examine the history of MLB‘s antitrust exemption, the 
history of MLB‘s rules and bylaws, and how this groundwork affects the 
payment of Minor League Baseball (―MiLB‖) players. In Part II, this 
note will assess the reasons why the antitrust exemption should be lifted 
through an analysis of how the business of baseball has changed since 
the granting of the exemption. Part II will then test whether MLB would 
be in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act if the exemption were to be 
lifted. Finally, Part II will conclude with a counter argument in favor of 
maintaining the exemption. 
Next, Part III of this note will provide some of the larger issues that 
have followed since the granting of the exemption, explaining how MLB 
has, over time, used the antitrust exemption to create a closed market as 
well as violate federal minimum wage and overtime laws. Part III will 
conclude with the effects that MLB‘s exemption has on its incoming 
employees. Part IV of this note will compare the National Collegiate 
Athletics Association (―NCAA‖) to MiLB in light of O‟Bannon v. 
NCAA
3
 and discuss how the court‘s analysis can be applied to MLB. 
Finally, Part V will provide a plausible solution that could potentially be 
used by MiLB players to combat MLB‘s rules and restrictions, and 
conclude with an overall recap followed by what needs to be done to fix 
the problem. 
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
In 2014, Miami Marlins outfielder Giancarlo Stanton (―Stanton‖) 
signed a thirteen-year contract worth $325 million, currently the largest 
contract in professional sports history.
4
 However, Stanton had to start 
where all other players start, in MiLB. Like Stanton, each player selected 
in the draft is forced to work over sixty to seventy hours per week for the 
five-month season
5
 and over forty hours per week in the offseason, while 
                                                                                                             
3 O‘Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
4 Bob Nightengale, Marlins, Giancarlo Stanton Finalize 13-Year, $325 Million Deal, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2014) http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2014/11/14/
giancarlo-stanton-marlins-contract-extension/19040675/. 
5 Second Amended Complaint for Violations of Federal and State Wage and Hour 
Laws at 35-36, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv-00608-
JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014)[hereinafter Complaint] 
During the roughly five-month championship season, minor league 
teams play games either six or seven days per week . . . minor 
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only earning preset yearly salaries.
6
 The players that eventually make it 
to the Major League level are paid substantially, with contracts ranging 
from six to as many as nine figures, while those who remain in MiLB, 
ranging from Single A to Triple A, make an average of four figures.
7
 
These salaries force players and their families to live in very harsh 
and meager conditions.
8
 MLB exploits these players by claiming that it is 
giving them the opportunity to make money playing a sport they love, 
and by glorifying the success stories of the small percentage of players 
who work up through the minor league system to a big pay day. 
However, the 6,000 other players that do not make it to MLB continue to 
fuel this beast. How do the owners get away with it? They do so by 
claiming that the players are developing in the minor league system and 
that they will make it to the majors once they have become talented 
enough. But the rules that MLB has implemented force these players to 
play for very little while they are under contract for approximately seven 
years; thus, MLB essentially leaves them stranded in the minor leagues 
without the ability to negotiate or even voluntarily leave.
9
 If they do 
leave, they are not allowed to play for any other team in MLB nor for 
any other professional domestic or foreign franchise.
10
 
                                                                                                             
leaguers must participate in mandatory pregame activities . . . with 
games averaging around three hours in length, minor leaguers usually 
work around eight mandatory hours at the stadium on these days . . . 
As part of the maintenance of first-class conditioning required . . . 
players must also regularly perform strength and conditioning 
workout during the season . . . Additionally, minor leaguers are 
required to perform protracted travel, usually by a team bus . . . bus 
rides each lasting several hours . . . The minor leaguer arrives to the 
home stadium before beginning the trip; packs belongings . . . loads 
the bus . . . The minor leaguer performs a similar process at the 
beginning and end of each trip. 
Id. at 35 (omissions from original in quoted text). 
6 See generally id. at 29-33. 
7 Complaint, supra note 5, at 33. It is important to note that players selected in the 
first few rounds of the draft receive high signing bonuses; however, these numbers 
become skewed as the players selected in the later rounds receive very minimal pay. 
8 See id. at 61 (―Because of these salaries, Mr. Ortiz struggled to live. He often lived 
with host families during the season, but when host families were not available he had to 
ask his mom for assistance to help pay for an apartment.‖); see also id. at 62 (―Because of 
these salaries, Mr. Jimenez struggled to live. At one point during the season, he and 
several teammates crammed six players into a 2-bedroom apartment to save on rent.‖); 
see also id. at 63 (―Because of these salaries, Mr. Watts struggled to live . . . he lived with 
many guys crammed into a small apartment. He often slept on a cheap air mattress during 
the season.‖) (omission from original in quoted text). 
9 Id. at 29. 
10 Id. (Players that voluntarily leave are ―subject to the discipline of the 
Commissioner‖). 
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To fully understand how MLB has not been punished for creating 
these arrangements, it is important to analyze its rules and history. In the 
1920‘s, MLB created a ―farm system‖ to develop players.11 In 1962, the 
league implemented a Player Development Plan, which required each 
MLB franchise to maintain a certain number of minor league teams.
12
 In 
today‘s league, each franchise has roughly forty players on its major 
league roster and approximately 150-250 players in its ―farm system,‖ 
generally consisting of four to five teams.
13
 This means that among the 
thirty teams in MLB, at any given time, it is employing around 6,000 
minor league players.
14
 1965 marked the creation of the Rule 4 Draft,
15
 
which mandates that all amateur players from the United States, Canada, 
and Puerto Rico participate in the draft in order to sign with a team.
16
 
The players in this draft are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two 
(with some being twenty-three), and once selected, they become the 
exclusive property of the drafting team without any ability to bargain 
with another.
17
 
A. Major League Baseball Rules 
The rules of MLB have been formed in a way which preclude 
freedom of contract. MLB has constantly suppressed signing bonuses to 
players due to oversight from the Commissioner of Baseball.
18
 In the late 
90‘s the commissioner effected a ―slotting system‖ that recommends 
signing bonuses for high picks in the draft.
19
  Furthermore, if a franchise 
wishes to exceed the recommended slot level, it must receive permission 
from the commissioner‘s office directly,20 which is unlikely. In 2012, 
current commissioner Bud Selig employed an even stricter system that 
places caps on the total amount a franchise can devote to these bonuses.
21
 
Around this time, Selig also imposed a bonus pool for Latin players in 
order to restrict signing bonuses for individual Latin players.
22
 Teams are 
allowed a certain number of signings up to a total amount, for Latin 
                                                                                                             
11 Complaint, supra note 5, at 25. 
12 Id. at 30. 
13 Id. at 25. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 26. 
16 Id. at 27. 
17 Complaint, supra note 5, at 27. 
18 Id. at 26. 
19 Id. 
20 Complaint, supra note 5, at 26. 
21 Id. at 27. 
22 Id. 
144 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:139 
 
players, which do not count against the teams allotted pools for players 
drafted.
23
 
MLB has also implemented a Uniform Player Contract (―UPC‖) that 
must be used by all franchises and approved by the commissioner 
directly.
24
 The UPC has removed all negotiating power by athletes that 
are drafted or signed outside of the draft because by not signing the UPC 
they will be forbidden from signing with another team.
25
 The 
requirements set by the UPC are that the franchise owns the player‘s 
rights for seven years and only the drafting franchise can deal the 
player‘s rights to another team.26 Not only can the player not sign with 
another team, but also upon signing the UPC, a player signs away his 
rights to play for another team outside or within MLB or the United 
States.
27
 Even those who want to retire during their seven-year term must 
receive commissioner approval under the UPC.
28
 
The rules also provide what the player‘s payments will be and 
restrictions on these payments. Major League Rule 3(c) provides a 
requirement that all first-year minor leaguers earn an amount established 
by MLB, currently around $1,100 per month, but these numbers are not 
made public so this is purely an estimate.
29
 The current salaries 
                                                                                                             
23 See Ben Badler, MLB Slashes Money for International Players While Draft Bonus 
Pools Rise, BASEBALL AMERICA (April 14, 2014) http://www.baseballamerica.com/
international/mlb-slashes-money-for-international-players-while-draft-bonus-pools-rise/. 
While the bonus pools for draft picks slightly increased for 2014, the 
amount that teams can spend on international players before facing 
taxes and other penalties has decreased for the third straight year. 
Technically, the aggregate bonus pools for international players rose 
by 1.2 percent, moving from $78,226,600 to $79,194,000. In reality, 
the amount that teams will be able to spend on international players is 
decreasing for the third straight year. That [is] because, for the first 
two years of the international bonus pools, teams were allowed six 
signings of up to $50,000 that would not count against their pools, 
giving each team an extra $300,000 beyond their pool space and $9 
million for the industry as a whole. When the 2014-15 international 
signing period begins on July 2, per the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, those $50,000 exemptions disappear. It [is] a clever 
accounting trick, one where Major League Baseball can claim that 
the international bonus pools are up a nominal amount from the 
previous year, when really the bar is being lowered. The reduction for 
international players comes while MLB has simultaneously raised the 
amount teams can spend on the draft before facing penalties for the 
last three years. 
24 Complaint, supra note 5, at 28-29. 
25 Complaint, supra note 5, at 29. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 29-30. 
29 Id. at 31. 
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―recommended‖ by MLB to be paid during a championship season are as 
follows: $1,100 per month for Rookie and Short-Season A, $1,250 per 
month for Class-A, $1,500 per month for Class-AA, and $2,150 per 
month for Class-AAA,
30
 with Rookie being the lowest level and Class-
AAA being the highest level of MiLB. It is important to note that these 
salaries are only paid during the five-month season, not the twelve-
month calendar year. Thus, it is estimated that most minor league players 
earn less than $7,500 per year, with some earning $3,000 or less.
31
 
Although the UPC allows players to negotiate for more money after the 
first year, there is a provision that states that if the franchise and player 
cannot agree to a salary, the franchise can simply set one and the player 
is forced to agree.
32
 
The UPC also requires players to ―perform professional services on a 
calendar year basis,‖ even though they are only paid during the five-
month championship playing season.
33
 Furthermore, there are required 
playing times for the players during the year when they will not be 
paid.
34
 Lastly, they are subject to fines if they do not stay conditioned 
throughout the calendar year.
35
 
MLB justifies these off-season requirements by claiming that they 
are to further hone the player‘s skills.36 However, the time-consuming 
requirements and lack of professional skills in other fields of work leave 
players at a severe disadvantage. They often work minimum wage jobs in 
the off-season that leave them no better off financially than during their 
paid baseball seasons.
37
 
                                                                                                             
30 Id. at 32. 
31 Complaint, supra note 5, at 33-34 
32 Complaint, supra note 5, at 32. 
33 Id. at 33. 
34 Id. at 33-34. (The UPC ―requires the minor leaguer to participate in spring 
training . . . [and] does not allow for salaries during this period since spring training falls 
outside the championship season . . . Around 30-50 minor leaguers per MLB Franchise 
do not earn a roster spot on a minor league team at the end of spring; they instead remain 
at the Franchise‘s spring training site . . . Since they are not participating in a 
championship season, MLB‘s UPC again does not require salaries to be paid . . . At the 
end of the championship season, around 30-45 . . . are selected [and required] to 
participate in an instructional league . . . Again, MLB‘S UPC . . . requires [players] to 
perform this work without pay‖) (alterations to original in quoted text) (omissions from 
original in quoted text). 
35 Id. at 34. 
36 Id. 
37 Andrew Keh, Chances are Extra Work in Off-Season Involves Baseball, Not a 
Second Job, N.Y. TIMES (February 23, 2013) available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/02/24/sports/baseball/for-baseball-players-finding-work-in-off-season-is-no-
longer-a-necessity.html?pagewanted=all (―For the fourth straight off-season, McHugh 
took a part time office job at Boosterthon Fun Run‖); see also id. (―[Marlon Byrd] 
delivered kitchen appliances for a company in Boynton Beach, worked as an attendant at 
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B. The History of Major League Baseball‟s Antitrust 
Exemption 
MLB has a long history of violating antitrust laws. In fact, MLB has 
the ability to simply buy out teams in the league that are not producing 
high profits in order to increase revenue. Furthermore, MLB reserves the 
right to allow or restrict the introduction of new franchises into the 
league, thus driving up the demand for the thirty current franchises. 
Franchises are granted super-majority voting requirements by MLB 
bylaws that are used to prevent cities that are financially capable of 
supporting franchises from joining the league.
38
 As stated by Gov. Jesse 
Ventura: 
Imagine for a minute that the American Association of Cell Phone 
Manufacturers met in Chicago last week and at the meeting thirty of the 
largest manufacturers got together for cocktails to identify which of them 
they could buy out and close down in order to reduce the output of their 
product and maximize the profitability of the remaining 
manufacturers . . . . But, of course, we all know that eventually their 
strategy would fail. It would fail because first of all, their conspiracy 
would very likely be in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and, in an 
act of fairness to all entrepreneurial Americans, the government would 
remedy the situation . . . . Right. Except for baseball.
39
 
The reason that MLB is able to do this is by using the antitrust 
exemption that was granted to it in 1922.
40
 In Federal Baseball Club v. 
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the court held that 
baseball was not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, reasoning that 
―[t]he business is giving exhibitions of [baseball], which are purely state 
affairs.‖41 The court acknowledged the fact that in order to hold these 
―exhibitions,‖ there must be travel across state lines, but that transport 
interstate is not the essential thing.
42
 
                                                                                                             
a golf course in Tarpon Springs and moonlighted as a bouncer at a bar in Clearwater‖) 
(emphasis added). 
38 Thomas A. Piaino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Professional 
Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677 (1996). 
39 Fairness in Antitrust in Nat‟l Sports (FANS) Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 3288 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 16-17 (2001) (statement of Jesse 
Ventura, Governor, State of Minnesota). 
40 Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat‘l League of Prof‘ Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 
(1922). 
41 Fed. Baseball Club, Inc., 259 U.S. at 208 (alterations to original in quoted text). 
42 Id. at 209. 
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II. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ITS ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
A. An Analysis of Why the Exemption Should be Lifted 
While professional athletes play their respective sports because they 
love them, it is always in the back of their mind that they must perform 
well in order to get paid well. It is no different for management: owners, 
general managers, and presidents enter into the professional sports 
industry because they love sports, but they too are constantly thinking 
about money, or how they can return the greatest profits. MLB thinks 
like this for one good reason—teams make a lot of money.43 For this 
reason alone, there needs to be a change in the laws that govern the 
industry. In 1922, when MLB received its antitrust exemption, there 
were a limited number of teams and players and few ways for fans to 
follow their teams. Today, MLB is an international sports giant, 
receiving revenue from television contracts, sponsorships, and a number 
of other sources.
44
 A good example of just how much the game has 
changed is the case of Stan Musial. Stan Musial was a Hall of Fame 
MLB player in the 1940s and ‗50s;45 however, in the offseason he sold 
Christmas trees from a parking lot to make extra money.
46
 In today‘s 
league, future Hall of Famers are making millions of dollars and would 
not need to, nor be able to sell, a Christmas tree without protection from 
fans looking to take pictures and receive autographs. 
Thus, the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Federal Baseball Club needs to 
be examined.
47
 MLB is using that ruling to further take advantage of its 
players by restricting their access to playing for teams in other states and 
forcing them into binding contracts that nullify their negotiating power. 
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., a MiLB player, Toolson, was 
assigned by his franchise to another franchise and upon his refusal to 
                                                                                                             
43 Maury Brown, MLB Revenues $7.5B for 2012, Could Approach $9B by 2014, BIZ 
OF BASEBALL (Dec. 10, 2012) http://www.bizofbaseball.com/?catid=30:mlb-news&id
=5769:mlb-revenues-75b-for-2012-could-approach-9b-by-2014&Itemid=42&option=co
m_content&view=article (―In 2012, revenue for MLB and its thirty teams surpassed $7.5 
billion, an increase of 257% since 1995. Annual revenue will continue to climb as new 
television contracts begin to perform and is expected to reach $9 billion in 2014‖). 
44 MLB International, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/international/mlbi_index.js
p (―[MLB] games are broadcast in 233 countries and territories in 17 different languages. 
During the 2013 season, over 74 million fans paid to attend MLB games‖) (alteration to 
original in quoted text). 
45 Keh, supra note 37. 
46 See id. (―[Stan Musial] . . . sold Christmas trees from a parking lot . . . during the 
late 1940s, when Musial was a three-time World Series winner and three-time National 
League Most Valuable Player.‖) (alteration to original in quoted text) (omission from 
original in quoted text). 
47 Fed. Baseball Club, supra note 40 at 209. 
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play for the new franchise, he was placed on the ineligible list for the 
assignee team.
48
 Furthermore, when he refused to report to the assignee 
team, MLB refused to allow him to play professional baseball 
altogether.
49
 Toolson filed a suit under the Sherman Act,
50
 but to no 
avail, as the court claimed that baseball was not held to be commerce or 
trade, but simply sport.
51
 
Although Toolson was handed down sixty years ago, the same issues 
continue to haunt MiLB players today. There are two interesting points 
that arose out of this case. The first arose in Gardella v. Chandler,
52
 in 
which the court mentioned that MLB might be viewed as commerce, as 
the radio and television aspects of the game had changed since the times 
of telegraphing the game play by play.
53
 This point is especially 
significant as in recent times because not only are games transmitted 
over the radio and television, but there are also live streams through the 
internet and satellite radio that make the games available to the entire 
world. If there were arguments made as early as 1951 for this change, it 
is hard to imagine why nothing has been done in the time since. 
The second interesting point follows the first closely. The Court of 
Appeals has found that it is not its place to disregard a decision made by 
the Supreme Court only thirty years prior
54
 and held that, if the Supreme 
Court had made an error in its former opinion, then it was up to the 
Supreme Court to correct that error.
55
 But nearly a century has passed 
since that decision was made. For a better perspective, it was only a 
                                                                                                             
48 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1951). 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 93 (Plaintiff filed suit under the Sherman Act, alleging that MLB is a 
monopoly and that he had been deprived of his livelihood by his inability to break his 
contract). 
51 Id. at 94; See also ALBERT THEODORE POWERS, THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 164 
(2003). 
The Curt Flood Act amends the Clayton Act to provide that practices 
―directly relating to or affecting major league baseball players‖ are 
subject to the federal antitrust laws. The Curt Flood Act specifically 
excludes from its coverage minor league baseball, the amateur draft, 
relations between the major and minor leagues, franchise relocations, 
intellectual property, broadcasting rights, and major league umpires, 
all of which continue to be exempted from the application of federal 
antitrust laws. 
52 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). 
53 Toolson, 101 F. Supp. at 94. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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couple years prior to the holding in Federal Baseball Club
56
 that women 
were given the right to vote.
57
 It is time for a change. 
It is vital here to examine the actual language of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act (―Act‖) to determine if modern day MLB would in fact be 
violating the law without its exemption. Section 1 of the Act provides a 
general guideline, stating that any form of contract that places restraints 
on interstate or foreign trade is prohibited.
58
 Hence, when a player is 
drafted, he is forced to either sign the UPC or not play professional 
baseball,
59
 and once signing the UPC, he is no longer allowed to sign a 
contract to play for any other baseball team in any state or even any 
foreign country.
60
 MLB is also allowed, due to the exemption, to impose 
industry-wide salary limits across state lines.
61
 Furthermore, Section 1 of 
the Act forbids conspiracy in restraint of trade.
62
 Conspiracy is an 
agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime
63
 and MLB 
consists of the offices of MLB as well as thirty franchises. This same 
argument can be made to show MLB‘s violation of Section 3 of the 
Act.
64
 
Section 2 of the Act provides a general rule forbidding monopolies 
from being formed.
65
 MLB‘s rules carefully regulate how and when a 
player can enter into the league and how and when they can reach the 
higher levels of their respective organization. Additionally, it is in no 
way illegal for MLB to become the prosperous industry it is today. MLB 
has thus become the one and only profession of its kind in the United 
                                                                                                             
56 Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 209. 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
58 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (―Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal . . . .‖) (omission 
from original in quoted text). 
59 Complaint at 28-29, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14-
cv-00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014). 
60 Senne, No. 3:14-cv-00608-JCS at 28-29. 
61 Keith Bradsher, Congressmen Pledge to Revoke Baseball‟s Antitrust Exemption, 
N.Y. TIMES (December 24, 1994) available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/24/s
ports/baseball-congressmen-pledge-to-revoke-baseball-s-antitrust-exemption.html. 
62 Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 58. 
63 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). 
64 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (―Every contract, combination in form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any territory of the 
United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between 
any such Territory and another . . . is hereby declared illegal . . . .‖) (omissions from 
original in quoted text). 
65 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (―Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty . . . .‖) (omissions from original in quoted text). 
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States, leading to young players having a strong desire to gain entry into 
the league. Lastly, Section 7 of the Act provides a remedy to any person 
that is injured by any other person or corporation for violating the Act.
66
 
Therefore, without the exemption granted to MLB an argument could be 
made that any and all MiLB players could bring suit, arguing that they 
have been injured by the strict contract provided by MLB. This analysis 
of the Act itself provides a strong argument against the nature of MLB, 
as well as the merits of its antitrust exemption. 
B. Reasons to Fight for the Antitrust Exemption 
On the other hand, an argument can be made that MLB‘s antitrust 
exemption is the only thing keeping MiLB running. ―The repeal of 
baseball‘s antitrust exemption would affect the incentive that MLB has to 
continue its investment in the minor leagues.‖67 Basically, if the 
exemption was lifted, there would be the risk that all of the above-
mentioned rules would be in violation of the Act and thus there would 
cause a domino effect. This effect would potentially destroy the 
competitive balance of MLB,
68
 as the franchises that have the most 
money would be able to pay higher prices for the top prospects.
69
 There 
would also be ripples affecting the small towns and cities where the 
teams are located and would potentially leave many prospects with no 
abilities to work their way up to the major leagues.
70
 Lastly, along with 
the lower level prospects, employees within MiLB organizations would 
be left without jobs and because of the very small revenue these teams 
create, these employees would be unable to afford a legal team to fight 
for their own rights.
71
 
                                                                                                             
66 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (―Any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden 
or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United 
State . . . .‖) (omissions from original in quoted text). 
67 Stanley M. Brand and Andrew J. Giorgione, The Effect of Baseball‟s Antitrust 
Exemption and Contraction on its Minor League Baseball System: A Case Study of the 
Harrisburg Senators, 10 VILL. SPORTS ENT. L.J. 49, 50 (2003). 
68 Id. at 51. 
69 See id. (―In the event of repeal, the minor league player draft and reserve clause 
might be challenged as illegal restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act‖). 
70 See id. at 52 (―The effect of eliminating the antitrust exemption would be quite 
severe because it would harm communities, careers, and people associated with baseball 
at both the major and minor league levels.‖) 
71 Brand, supra note 67, at 52 (―Minor League Baseball has virtually no television 
revenue, and ticket sales and fence sign advertising do not generate sufficient cash flow 
to support a legion of lawyers.‖) 
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In 1998, Congress passed legislation that affected MLB‘s antitrust 
exemption, but it did not affect MiLB in any way.
72
 In response, MiLB 
made three sound arguments in support of minor league exemption. The 
first was that, because the MiLB existed, millions of fans were able to 
watch professional baseball, whereas they would otherwise have no other 
opportunity to be able do so.
73
 MiLB also argued that without the support 
of MLB, the communities that the MiLB teams were located in would be 
unable to support their local teams.
74
 Lastly, it argued that MLB would 
have much less incentive to provide the payment of salaries and other 
costs to MiLB players, management, and staff.
75
 
While these arguments seem very strong, MiLB, not MiLB players, 
made them. MiLB players potentially hold a lot of power within MLB. If 
all 6,000 MiLB players decided to quit or go on strike because of their 
working conditions, MLB would likely have to make changes. Without 
these players, the talent level in MLB would steadily decline, teams 
would struggle to replace retired or injured players, and fans would likely 
become weary of paying to watch a less competitive sport. Thus, had 
there been a MiLB labor union in 1998, it can be argued that there would 
have been more MiLB arguments in favor of change as opposed to the 
result that occurred. 
III. HOW MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL‘S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
HAS LED TO LARGER ISSUES 
A. The Destruction of a Free Market 
MLB‘s antitrust exemption goes further than just exploiting MiLB 
players. MLB enjoys the ability to control what is supposed to be a free 
market. Because of the exemption, MLB can not only block franchises 
from joining the league, but can also block teams from moving their 
franchise to a different city. Generally, in professional sports the teams in 
                                                                                                             
72 Stanley M. Brand, The Case for the Minor League Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 14 
ANTITRUST 31 (2000). 
73 See id. at 32 (―Maintaining the exemption thus serves the public good by increasing 
the availability of minor league baseball.‖) 
74 See id. (―That purpose is furthered because maintenance of the exemption fosters 
Major League Baseball‘s financial support to the minor leagues, without which many 
smaller or rural communities could not support professional baseball.‖) 
75 See id. (―The subsidy provided to minor league baseball by MLB in the form of 
minor league player salaries and other costs, which MLB would have much less incentive 
to provide if it could not retain control of minor league players through the minor 
leagues‘ six-year reserve clause and player draft is critical to preservation of the minor 
leagues.‖) 
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large part succeed due to the amount of revenue they are able to generate. 
This is because the more money the team produces, the more flexibility it 
has to maintain expensive players as well as sign high-level players 
through free agency. This is usually due to teams having better records, 
bigger fan bases, and being located in larger markets.
76
 This results in a 
severe disadvantage to those teams that do not have these same benefits, 
such as the MLB franchise in Oakland.
77
 To illustrate, around 2010, the 
City of San Jose desired to move the Oakland Athletics to their city, 
offering a new stadium.
78
 However, using the shield that is their antitrust 
exemption, MLB was able to block this move. 
MLB also has the power to allow or to forbid the creation of new 
franchises at its discretion. By having this power, the number of teams in 
the league is kept to a smaller number than what would exist in a free 
market.
79
 ―The owner‘s refusals to expand their leagues to meet the 
demand for additional franchises constitutes exactly the type of conduct 
that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.‖80 The reason that MLB 
wishes to maintain a low number of franchises is because owners of 
franchises are in competition with each other to maintain the high value 
of their respective franchises, thus increasing their own worth.
81
 ―If the 
members of a sports league did not compete . . . they would be perfectly 
willing to expand the number of franchises . . . .‖82 
B. Major League Baseball‟s Violation of Federal Minimum 
Wage and Overtime Laws 
Although the federal minimum wage law has not changed since 
2009, its $7.25 per hour
83
 minimum is still being violated by MLB in the 
                                                                                                             
76 See Chi. Prof‘l Sports Ltd. P‘ship v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 
1541-42 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (―[T]he richest teams enjoy competitive advantages [such as] 
the ability to bid for free agents or to pay to keep their own players . . . .‖) (alteration to 
original in quoted text) (omission from original in quoted text). 
77 Other small market teams include: The Cleveland Indians, The Kansas City Royals, 
The Cincinnati Reds, The Tampa Bay Rays, etc. 
78 Justin B. Bryant, Analyzing the Scope of Major League Baseball‟s Antitrust 
Exemption in Light of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1841 (2014). 
79 Thomas A. Piaino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Professional 
Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677 (1996) (―The owners have successfully conspired 
to keep the number of franchises substantially below that which would exist in a free 
market.‖) 
80 Id. at 1678. 
81 See Piaino, supra note 79, at 1689 (― . . . [B]ecause the team owners are in 
competition with each other in the market for the sale of franchises, they have an 
incentive to limit the number of teams available‖) (alteration to original in quoted text). 
82 Id. (omissions from original in quoted text). 
83 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2009). 
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pay of MiLB players. Using an average player‘s salary of $5,500 per 
year
84
 would mean that a player is making roughly $1.76 per hour during 
a championship season and $2.65 per hour in the offseason.
85
 One reason 
for these astonishingly low numbers is that in the last forty years 
inflation has risen more than 400 percent, while MiLB salaries have risen 
a mere 75 percent.
86
 The second and equally surprising reason for these 
incredibly low numbers is MLB‘s violation of federal overtime pay laws. 
The $7.25 minimum wage is based on a forty-hour workweek.
87
 
Although MiLB players work more than forty hours per week, they are 
not receiving overtime pay. If that were the case, these numbers would 
not seem so skewed. In fact, a court held in 1998 that baseball was not 
exempt from federal overtime laws.
88
 In Bridewell v. The Cincinnati 
Reds, the Sixth Circuit held that the Cincinnati Reds were not exempt 
from the federal overtime laws because the organization operates year 
round with over 100 employees.
89
 Therefore, the defendant‘s argument 
that the organization is a seasonal employer was struck down.
90
 Although 
the plaintiff in Bridewell was a maintenance worker rather than a 
baseball player,
91
 a similar argument can be made that because MLB 
requires players to maintain playing condition, participate in spring 
                                                                                                             
84 Complaint at 33, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv-
00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014) (― . . . [M]ost minor leaguers earn less than 
$7,500 per calendar year. Some earn $3,000 or less.‖) (alteration to original in quoted 
text). 
85 A $5,500 salary divided into fifty-two weeks is roughly $106 per week. A 
championship season consists of roughly twenty weeks during which players are working 
around sixty hours per week, thus earning an hourly wage of around $1.76. The 
remainder of the year is roughly thirty-two weeks during which players are working 
around forty hours per week; thus earning an hourly wage of $2.65 per hour. 
86 Howard Megdal, The Plight of the Minor League Baseball Wage Slave, VICE 
SPORTS (November 4, 2014) https://sports.vice.com/article/the-plight-of-the-minor-league
-baseball-wage-slave (―In other words: When Baltimore Orioles manager Buck 
Showalter talks about pocketing just $13,000 for a single season in Sarasota some 30-plus 
years ago, he was still earning more than three times in relative purchasing power than 
what he would be making today.‖) 
87 Fair Labor Standards Act, supra note 83. 
88 Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 829 (6th Cir. 1998). 
89 Id. at 829. 
90 See id. (―We reversed the district court‘s judgment, however, and held that the 
proper focus was not on the duration of the baseball season, but on the fact that the Reds 
organization operated year-round with no fewer than 120 employees in the ‗off-season‘‖). 
91 See id. (― . . . Plaintiffs-Appellees, Robert Bridewell and others, as a part of [The 
Reds] maintenance staff at Riverfront Stadium . . . .‖) (alteration to original in quoted 
text). 
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training, and execute workout packets,
92
 it follows that they therefore are 
not simply seasonal employees.
93
 
So, MLB pays wages that are illegal according to federal minimum 
wage laws, violates overtime wage laws, and does not provide payment 
for work performed outside of the championship season. However, a 
common response to these accusations is that there is a long seven-month 
off-season during which players can secure second jobs to support 
themselves.
94
 While this may be true, and while players more often than 
not obtain second jobs during the off-season, there are few employers 
that will hire someone who can only work for seven months, and the 
employers that can, do not pay much more than MiLB. 
C. The Ramifications of Major League Baseball‟s Antitrust 
Exemption on Minor League Baseball Players 
Furthermore, MLB‘s low pay is bad for the public good. As noted, 
one of MiLB‘s arguments in 1998 was that it provided a public good by 
offering fans the ability to watch professional baseball. However, by 
paying players such low salaries and by forcing them to sign a binding 
contract for seven years, MLB has taken a young man into adulthood and 
thrown him into the world with a lack of education and life experience. 
For example: Player A is a nineteen year-old baseball player drafted and 
sent to play for MiLB. From that point on, he has seven years to make it 
to the major league level. If after those seven years he has not made it, 
then it is likely the team will not want to resign him. Rather, they can 
simply draft another nineteen year-old that year and try to make it work 
out better for the new draftee and the franchise. Now Player A is jobless 
at twenty-six years old, has not received any sort of higher education, has 
very little if any work experience, and has no money to his name. It is 
not overly cynical to think that this player will most likely have 
difficulties succeeding in life. Thus, this system is ultimately bad for the 
public. 
                                                                                                             
92 Complaint, supra note 84, at 34 (―It is believed that all Franchises direct the winter 
work by issuing training packets to all players. Many, and perhaps all, Franchises monitor 
workouts and punish players for not performing off-season workouts‖). 
93 See Megdal, supra note 86 (alteration to original in quoted text). 
If anything, a good case can be made that minor leaguers are more 
than full-time employees, at least if they [are] doing their jobs right. 
Baseball excellence requires practice and repetition, countless hours 
of fielding grounders and grooving one‘s swing, all in addition to 
playing actual games. It requires physical conditioning, too, which 
means working out and eating well, neither of which is cheap. 
94 Keh, supra note 37. 
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The age argument is also the perfect response to combat a couple of 
claims MLB could raise. The first claim is that if players did not want to 
be subject to such harsh conditions they could use their talents to receive 
scholarships at colleges and universities and gain an education. The 
second claim is that by providing such low salaries, MLB is not 
poisoning college baseball by incentivizing young players to forgo 
college. However, for the young baseball player, age is everything. For 
every year that passes, a player‘s value decreases due to the constantly 
growing arsenal of newer, younger players with similar skill levels. It is a 
bit easier to think of this from a business standpoint. More often than not, 
the owner of a franchise would much rather pay the $1100 first year 
price for an eighteen year-old prospect that is almost at the same skill 
level as a twenty-two year old college athlete. In those four years, the 
franchise will be able to have complete control over the development of 
that player, whereas the college athlete will be twenty-six years old by 
that point. 
MLB constantly uses words like ―development‖ and 
―developmental‖ to describe its contracts and systems.95 This creates the 
façade that the seven-year exclusivity contract is the exact amount of 
time it would take to develop a young athlete into a major league 
baseball player. However, it is interesting to note that this contract was 
not always for seven years; twenty years ago, it was only six.
96
 So, it 
seems that quite a bit has changed in MLB‘s rules and guidelines, but not 
much has changed regarding the violation of wage laws and their 
antitrust exemption. 
IV. COMPARING THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION TO MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
MiLB and the NCAA are very similar in that both train and coach 
players who may eventually become elite professional players. These 
two organizations were formed at a time when sports were not seen as a 
business. ―The actual formation of the NCAA dates back to the early-
                                                                                                             
95 Complaint, at 30, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv-
00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014) (―The MLB . . . uses a vertically integrated 
system of development for these minor leaguers. Players begin at the lowest levels of 
MLB‘s developmental system, levels known as Rookie and Short-Season A. Ideally they 
then advance to higher levels: Class-A, Advanced Class-A, Double- A, and Triple-A . . . 
―) (alteration to original in quoted text). 
96 See Baseball‟s Antitrust Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic 
and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 114, 123 (1994) (―If 
MLB determines that antitrust laws make it too risky to draft and then reserve players for 
six years . . . .‖) (omission from original in quoted text). 
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1900s when President Theodore Roosevelt called a meeting to lay 
ground rules and regulations for football to ensure the safety of future 
players.‖97 At the time, ―[i]t was common for schools to settle debates on 
athletic ability purely through . . . [sport] competitions.‖98 Additionally, 
MiLB was formed in 1901,
99
 at a time when professional baseball 
players were not the international icons they are today and when the 
business of baseball was not producing the type of income it does today. 
NCAA institutions make millions of dollars a year by exploiting 
their college athletes and hiding behind the idea that it is a fair trade-off 
for the education provided.
100
 The similarities between the exploitation of 
these athletes and MiLB players are quite obvious. Both organizations 
require countless hours of work by their athletes both in their 
championship seasons and in the offseason with little to no 
compensation. MiLB uses the dream of making it to the major leagues
101
 
and being paid millions much as the NCAA uses the free education 
ostensibly provided to defend the lack of compensation to the athletes.
102
 
However, it can be argued that these players are not on scholarship for 
educational purposes, but rather to provide the university with talented 
athletes that will increase demand and increase revenue.
103
 In addition, in 
                                                                                                             
97 Formation of the NCAA: An Unexpected Beginning, NCAA HISTORY GUIDE, 
(November 21, 2012 9:00 AM), http://ncaahistoryguide.com/formation-ncaa-unexpected-
beginning/. 
98 Id. (alteration to original in quoted text) (emphasis added). 
99 The History & Function of Minor League Baseball, The Official Site of Minor 
League Baseball (July 8, 2011) http://www.milb.com/milb/history/general_history.jsp. 
100 See O‘Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp. 3d 955, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (― . . . [N]one of 
these leagues offers the same opportunity to earn a higher education that FBS football 
and Division I basketball schools provide‖) (omission from original in quoted text) 
(alteration to original in quoted text). 
101 Complaint, supra note 95, at 31 (―Given that MLB carefully controls the entryway 
into the highest levels of baseball, and given the young minor leaguer‘s strong desire to 
enter the industry, MLB and Defendants have exploited minor leaguers . . . .‖) (omission 
from original in quoted text). 
102 See O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 973 (Dr. Emmert testified that ―the rules over the 
hundred-year history of the NCAA around amateurism have focused on, first of all, 
making sure that any resources that are provided to a student-athlete are only those that 
are focused on his or her getting an education.‖). 
103 See Pete Volk, Richard Sherman on the NCAA: „You‟re not on scholarship for 
school‟, SB NATION, (Jan. 30, 2015 11:51 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2015/1/30/7951529/seahawks-richard-sherman-michael-bennett-slam-ncaa 
(Richard Sherman on the NCAA: ―No, I do [not] think college athletes are given enough 
time to really take advantage of the free education that they [are] given . . . People think, 
‗Oh, you [are] on scholarship.‘ They pay for your room and board, they pay for your 
education, but to their knowledge, you [are] there to play football. You [are] not on 
scholarship for school and it sounds crazy when a student-athlete says that, but those are 
the things coaches tell them every day . . . .‘‖) (alteration to original in quoted text) 
(omission from original in quoted text). 
2015] SOCIAL INJUSTICE IN MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 157 
 
both instances the players are the ones that are actually generating the 
revenue for the organizations by being the product that produces such 
high demand. 
The NCAA provides rules that threaten a loss of eligibility in order 
to prevent student athletes from being able to negotiate.
104
 Student 
athletes are barred from endorsing any commercial product or service 
while they are in school, regardless of whether or not they receive any 
compensation in doing so.
105
 However, these same athletes must provide 
their school with their athletic services and acquiesce in the use of their 
names, images, and likeness for commercial and promotional 
purposes.
106
 
The NCAA‘s extortion of college athletes in order to gain large 
revenues is similar to MLB‘s extortion of MiLB players. Players in both 
institutions are overworked while receiving minimal remuneration and, 
at the same time, are providing the entertainment that the institutions 
need to maintain revenue. If MiLB players did not exist, MLB would 
lose the funneling of high-level talent to the Major Leagues. This would 
likely lead to less demand from fans, because quality of the product 
MLB would be putting on the field would decline. 
Although the NCAA provision states that players should be 
motivated primarily by education, NCAA allows football players to leave 
for the National Football League (NFL) draft if they are three years 
removed from high school
107
 and allows basketball players to leave for 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) draft after only one year in 
college.
108
 Thus, unless these athletes graduate at an expedited rate, they 
                                                                                                             
104 It is important to note that upon losing amateur status student-athletes are no longer 
eligible to play collegiate sports. See id. at 974-75 (―The amateurism provision in the 
NCAA‘s current constitution states that student-athletes shall be amateurs in an 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education 
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.‖) 
105 See id. (―Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and 
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial 
enterprises.‖). 
106 Id. at 966. 
107 Kevin Clark, NFL Draft: College Football‟s NFL Problem, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(March 2, 2014) available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230458
5004579415241023161788 (―Since the late 1980s, the NFL has allowed players who are 
three years removed from high school to enter the draft‖). 
108 Chris Anderson, Is One-and-Done the Best Policy for College Basketball, 
BLEACHER REPORT (April 18, 2012) http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1150413-college-
baksetball-is-one-and-done-the-best-policy-for-college-basketball (―A player shall be 
eligible for selection in the first NBA Draft with respect to which he has satisfied all 
applicable requirements of section 1(b)(i) below and one of the requirements of Section 
1(b)(ii) below: (i) The player (A) is or will be at least 19 years of age during the calendar 
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will not be leaving with a degree.
109
 As a result, if these student-athletes 
do not succeed as professionals, they drop into the real world in a similar 
situation to that of MiLB players after their seven-year exclusivity 
period. Additionally, while college players are supposed to be motivated 
by education and MiLB players by the opportunities of the major 
leagues, both organizations reap the benefits through jersey sales, 
naming rights, gate and media receipts, etc.
110
 
A. Laying the Groundwork for Change 
Like MLB, the NCAA can be viewed as an organization that puts 
restraints on free trade.
111
 This has led to antitrust and labor suits similar 
to what MLB has dealt with over the years. The difference, recently, is 
that there has been forward progress in remedying this potentially illegal 
situation in the NCAA. The most recent case concerning the NCAA 
involves the payment of student-athletes.
112
 In O‟Bannon v. NCAA, the 
court used a rule of reason test to decide whether plaintiffs can prevail on 
a violation of the Sherman Act claim.
113
 The rule of reason test is a 
burden-shifting framework
114
 and in order to be successful, a plaintiff 
                                                                                                             
year in which the Draft is held, and (B) . . . at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since 
the player‘s graduation from high school.‖) (omission from original in quoted text). 
109 Id. (―From a university perspective, this is a complete hypocrisy of what a university 
is supposed to stand for. Though athletics are surely a huge industry in the college 
atmosphere, a university‘s main goal is to ensure the education and advancement of its 
own students. These athletes who come in for a year, take minimal credits, and leave the 
next are making a complete mockery of the system and taking away scholarship money 
from much more deserving students as well as student-athletes‖). 
110 Darren Rovell, NCAA President: No Pay for Players on Jersey Sales, CNBC 
(December 22, 2011) http://www.cnbc.com/id/45768248# (―[The] Adidas contract with 
Michigan is the largest in the country, an eight-year, $66.5 million deal signed in 2007. 
After they won the BCS Championship, Alabama signed an eight-year extension with 
Nike worth almost $30 million‖) (alteration to original in quoted text). 
111 See O‘Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 991 (― . . . [S]chools could alternatively be 
characterized as buyers in a market for recruits‘ athletic services and licensing rights. The 
relevant market would be that for the recruitment of the highest ranked male high school 
football and basketball players each year‖) (omission from original in quoted text) 
(alteration to original in quoted text). 
112 See id. at 962-63 (―Plaintiffs are a group of current and former college student-
athletes. They brought this antitrust class action against the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) in 2009 to challenge the association‘s rules restricting 
compensation for elite men‘s football and basketball players‖). 
113 See id. at 985 (―When ‗restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all,‘ per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must 
be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.‖) (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat‘l 
Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010)). 
114 See id. (citing from Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063) (alteration to 
original in quoted text) (omission of citations in quoted text). 
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must show that ―[t]he restraint‘s harm to competition outweighs its 
procompetitive effects.‖115 
The court found that the initial burden on the plaintiff was met by 
holding that FBS football schools and Division I basketball schools 
provide a distinct market.
116
 The court further held that because these 
schools are the only suppliers in that market, they are able to fix the price 
of their product.
117
 The burden was then shifted to the NCAA, which 
claimed four procompetitive justifications
118
 that were subsequently 
found to be insufficient.
119
 The first justification provided by the NCAA 
was the preservation of amateurism in college sports
120
; however, the 
Court concluded that the restrictions set by the NCAA played a minor 
role in the consumer demand for FBS football and Division I 
basketball.
121
 The second justification was the promoting of a 
competitive balance among FBS football and Division I basketball 
                                                                                                             
[T]he ‗plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the restraint 
produces ―significant anticompetitive effects‖ within a ―relevant 
market.‘‘ If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, ―the defendant 
must come forward with evidence of the restraint‘s procompetitive 
effects.‖ Finally, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must 
―show that ‗any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a 
substantially less restrictive manner.‘‖ 
115 Id. (quoting from Tanaka) (alteration to original in quoted text). 
116 See id. at 987. 
117 O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp 3d at 988 (Holding that the Plaintiff met his initial 
burden)(―Because FBS football and Division I basketball schools are the only suppliers in 
the relevant market, they have the power, when acting in concert through the NCAA and 
its conferences, to fix the price of their product. They have chosen to exercise this power 
by forming an agreement to charge every recruit the same price for the bundle of 
educational and athletic opportunities that they offer: to wit, the recruit‘s athletic services 
along with the use of his name, image, and likeness while he is in school. If any school 
seeks to lower this fixed price—by offering any recruit a cash rebate, deferred payment, 
or other form of direct compensation—that school may be subject to sanctions by the 
NCAA‖). 
118 See id. at 999 (―(1) the preservation of amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting 
competitive balance among FBS football and Division I basketball teams; (3) the 
integration of academics and athletics; and (4) the ability to generate greater output in the 
relevant markets‖). 
119 See generally id. at 999-1003. 
120 See id. at 999. 
121 See id. at 1001 (rejecting the NCAA‘s first procompetitive justification of preserving 
amateurism in college sports)(― [T]he NCAA‘s restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation play a limited role in driving consumer demand for FBS football and 
Division I basketball-related products. Although they might justify a restriction on large 
payments to student-athletes while in school, they do not justify the rigid prohibition on 
compensating student-athletes, in the present or in the future, with any share of licensing 
revenue generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses‖) (alteration to 
original in quoted text). 
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teams.
122
 In regards to this, the Court held that the evidence did not show 
that a particular level of competitive balance was needed in order to 
maximize consumer demand.
123
 The third justification was the 
integration of academics and athletics,
124
 which the Court found 
unpersuasive, claiming that the NCAA cannot use this goal in order to 
prohibit any student-athlete compensation.
125
 The last justification 
provided by the NCAA was the ability to generate greater output in the 
relevant markets;
 126
 however, the Court found that this was unsupported 
by the record.
127
 The final step in the test is for the plaintiff to show that 
there are alternatives that are less strict, yet as effective.
128
 However, 
while the plaintiff provided alternatives,
129
 the court found that these 
were not necessary as the defendant‘s failed in its obligation under the 
                                                                                                             
122 See id. at 999. 
123 O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 1002 (Rejecting the NCAA‘s second procompetitive 
justification)(―Accordingly, the NCAA may not rely on competitive balance here as a 
justification for the challenged restraint. Its evidence is not sufficient to show that it must 
create a particular level of competitive balance among FBS football and Division I 
basketball teams in order to maximize consumer demand for its product. Nor is it 
sufficient to show that the challenged restraint actually helps it achieve the optimal level 
of competitive balance‖). 
124 See id. at 999. 
125 See id. at 1003(Rejecting the NCAA‘s third procompetitive justification)(―[T]he 
only way in which the challenged rules might facilitate the integration of academics and 
athletics is by preventing student-athletes from being cut off from the broader campus 
community. Limited restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help schools 
achieve this narrow procompetitive goal. As with the NCAA‘s amateurism justification, 
however, the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its sweeping prohibition on any 
student-athlete compensation, paid now or in the future, from licensing revenue generated 
from the use of student-athletes‘ names, images, and likenesses.‖) (alteration to original 
in quoted text). 
126 See id. at 999. 
127 See id. at 1004 (Rejecting the NCAA‘s fourth procompetitive justification)(―[T]he 
NCAA‘s argument that the current rules enable some schools to participate in Division I 
that otherwise could not afford to do so is unsupported by the record. Neither the NCAA 
nor its member conferences require high-revenue schools to subsidize the FBS football or 
Division I basketball teams at lower-revenue schools‖) (alteration to original in quoted 
text). 
128 O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 985. 
129 See id. at 1005. Court provides the alternatives that the NCAA raised: 
[P]laintiffs have identified two legitimate less restrictive alternatives 
for achieving these goals. First, the NCAA could permit FBS football 
and Division I basketball schools to award stipends to student-
athletes up to the full cost of attendance, as that term is defined in the 
NCAA‘s bylaws, to make up for any shortfall in its grants-in-aid. 
Second, the NCAA could permit its schools to hold in trust limited 
and equal shares of its licensing revenue to be distributed to its 
student-athletes after they leave college or their eligibility expires. 
See id. (omission from original) (alteration to original). 
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framework.
130
 The plaintiff‘s success in this case is going to lead to 
substantial changes soon for the NCAA and it may lead to even more 
changes in the future. 
B. Applying the O‟Bannon Rationale to a Potential Case 
Against Major League Baseball 
O‟Bannon can be used to examine the potential ramifications of a 
lawsuit against MLB. A strong argument can be made that by applying 
the same burden-shifting framework from O‟Bannon, MLB may be 
unsuccessful in maintaining its antitrust exemption. First, the 
hypothetical plaintiff could raise the same argument to show that MLB‘s 
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant 
market.
131
 A court would likely hold that the qualitative differences 
between MLB and its alternatives provides MLB with a distinct market 
because MLB is the only supplier in this market and is able to fix prices 
(i.e., the UPC contract that every player drafted is forced to sign). 
The burden would then shift to MLB to provide evidence of the 
restraint‘s procompetitive effects.132 MLB‘s strongest argument would 
likely be that its rules provide a competitive balance amongst all thirty 
franchises and that, without it, the wealthiest franchises would simply 
outbid the others for the top prospects. However, a court could well find 
that the removal of the restrictions forced on draftees by the UPC would 
not have any effect on the consumer demand for the product because 
most—if not all—franchises‘ fan bases continue to support the teams that 
they have been supporting for years, independent of their performance. It 
would not be difficult to prove that this is true because, if it were not, 
then every year the last place team would be unable to provide the 
financial support to continue to be a franchise in the following year. 
Even if MLB were able to provide a procompetitive justification, 
plaintiffs would likely be able to point to less restrictive alternatives
133
 
that would yield the same results that MLB has seen throughout the 
years. The alternative that is staring MLB in the face is to pay MiLB 
players more money. This would provide benefits to both parties as the 
players would be able to earn a real livelihood,
134
 and MLB would not be 
                                                                                                             
130 See id. (―A court need not address the availability of less restrictive alternatives for 
achieving a purported procompetitive goal ‗when the defendant fails to meet its own 
obligation under the rule of reason burden-shifting procedure.‘‖) (quoting PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1913b (Aspen Pub., 3d ed. 2006)). 
131 Id. at 985. 
132 O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 985. 
133 Id. 
134 Howard Megdal, The Plight of the Minor League Baseball Wage Slave, VICE 
SPORTS (Nov. 4, 2014, 8:30 AM), https://sports.vice.com/article/the-plight-of-the-
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risking the potential violation of federal minimum wage and overtime 
laws. A court would likely find that running in parallel with this solution 
would be the introduction of a strict cap on individual contracts at the 
major league level. This would limit the amount of money paid to major 
leaguers and would thereby allocate more funds to pay minor league 
players more. For example, if the cap were set to $150 million, Giancarlo 
Stanton‘s contract would leave open an additional $175 million that 
could be used to pay MiLB players more. MLB could even go as far as 
setting low-level, mid-level, and high-level caps based on players 
performances. 
The problem with implementing this alternative however, lies within 
baseball‘s collective bargaining agreement between MLB and the MLB 
Players Association (―MLBPA‖), which would require the players to 
agree to the hard salary cap. However, only one in every six players 
drafted (roughly 17.2 percent) make it to the major league level;
135
 thus, 
it does not seem plausible that the MLBPA would agree to lowering 
salaries. As such, a second alternative is more realistic. If MLB gave 
draftees the ability to negotiate their contract rights, it would eliminate 
the exclusivity period and leave MLB free and clear of potential 
ramifications of blocking free trade. 
These less restrictive alternatives would leave MLB in the same 
financial position it currently holds. Additionally, the concerns that 
MiLB raised in 1998 would likely not materialize. The fans who are able 
to watch professional baseball, and who arguably otherwise would not 
have the opportunity, will retain that ability. Lastly, the fear that MiLB 
would lose its financial support from MLB, and that MLB would lose its 
incentive to continue to support MiLB, would become moot. 
                                                                                                             
minor-league-baseball-wage-slave. Howard Megdal on why MLB should be incentivized 
to pay players more money: 
If it sounds like major league teams are being penny-wise and pound-
foolish by keeping minor league salaries so low—essentially, 
starving their own seed corn to save a few bucks—well, there [is] 
some truth to that. After all, baseball is made up of 30 teams looking 
for absolutely any competitive edge they can find. More and more of 
them are aware of the role that nutrition plays in the development and 
maintenance of athletic performance. Lawsuits and basic fairness 
aside, those teams have every incentive to pay their future major 
league workforce well enough to focus on the sport alone. 
 
135 See Matt Eddy, One in Six Picks Will Click on Trek from Draft to Majors, BASEBALL 
AMERICA (July 22, 2013) http://www.baseballamerica.com/draft/one-in-six-draft-picks-
will-click/ (―Baseball America arrived at that number by analyzing the 22 drafts from 
1987 through 2008, noting the number of signed players who reached the big leagues for 
at least one game‖). 
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V. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW A LABOR UNION 
IN MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL COULD FIGHT FOR CHANGE 
AND THE BARRIERS PREVENTING ONE FROM FORMING 
―All team sports have unions to represent them in contract 
negotiations, arbitration hearings, working conditions and do all the 
things unions do for their members—almost all groups, that is. Minor 
League baseball players are the lone group of professional athletes not 
represented by a players‘ organization.‖136 In 1956, MLB players formed 
a union in order to combat MLB‘s rules and restrictions.137 This labor 
union has become one of the strongest in the country.
138
 Unfortunately, it 
does not include MiLB players, leaving them vulnerable to every 
restriction set by MLB. 
The combination of MLB‘s antitrust exemption and the lack of a 
labor union have ultimately led to the issues raised here. The simple 
solution would be for MiLB players to form a union to protect their 
rights; however, there are a number of barriers preventing them from 
doing so. These barriers include risk, financial consideration, labor 
market weaknesses, and demographics.
139
 
Due to the abundance of young talented baseball players, those who 
have been signed to a franchise are generally unwilling to risk losing 
their current situation. For this reason, it is hard to expect a young 
ballplayer to stick his neck out for not only himself, but also for all other 
MiLB players, by lobbying for a union. This is yet another instance of 
U.S. labor laws‘ weakness on one-sidedness. The vulnerability of those 
who attempt to unionize pervades the entire economy.
140
 There is a fear 
                                                                                                             
136 Harold Uhlman, Minor League Baseball—Is Financial Emancipation on the Way?, 
THINK BLUE LA (March 15, 2014) http://www.thinkbluela.com/index.php/2014/03/15/m
inor-league-baseball-is-financial-emancipation-on-the-way/. 
137 TONY COLLINS, SPORT IN A CAPITALIST SOCIETY: A SHORT HISTORY 113 (2013). 
138 See Ian Gordon, Minor League Baseball Players Make Poverty-Level Wages, 
MOTHER JONES (July/August 2014) http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/baseba
ll-broshuis-minor-league-wage-income (―The Major League Baseball Players Association 
is sports‘ strongest union, but it does [not] represent minor leaguers and often signs away 
their rights in collective bargaining agreements struck with team owners‖) (alteration to 
original). 
139 See generally Uhlman, supra note 136. 
140 See Lance Compa, Slumming in America, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 5, 2010) 
http://prospect.org/article/slumming-america (―The most common violations allowed 
under U.S. law are aggressive, one-sided, fear mongering campaigns that employers 
launch when workers try to form unions. Managers can haul workers into captive 
audience meetings, forbidding any talk-back, to hear ―predictions‖ of workplace closure 
if employees form a union, as long as the predictions are not threats. This prediction-
versus-threat distinction pleases judges and lawyers but leaves workers baffled and 
scared‖) (alteration to original). 
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amongst players that by doing this they will offend their parent team.
141
 
Both Marvin Miller, the Executive Director of the MLBPA from 1966 to 
1982, and Gene Orza, a retired MLBPA attorney, have both spoken to 
this problem: 
Marvin Miller: ‗The notion that these very young, inexperienced 
people were going to defy the owners, when they had stars in their eyes 
about making it to the major leagues, it [is] just not going to happen‘ . . . 
Gene Orza: ―Young players  are unlikely to make noise while they 
[are] trying to get promoted—they do [not]  want to tick off [the 
club] by being the person who forms the union.‖142 
Additionally, former MiLB player Garrett Broshuis has confirmed 
this, stating that ― . . . [e]very single player you talk to, even if they 
realize [a union] would be a good thing, is also scared to death to talk to 
another player about it.‖143 
Financial considerations are also a barrier to the formation of a 
union. A major union is unlikely to come to MiLB in an effort to 
unionize because the financial rewards for it would be very limited. In 
order for the major union to be successful in organizing, it would need to 
provide ― . . . [s]taff, office space, attorneys, travel, and other 
expenses . . . .‖144 To be able to provide these things, the union would 
collect dues; however, because of the lack of finances from MiLB 
players the dues would not be sufficient to cover the costs.
145
 Thus, there 
is little incentive for a union to take on this challenge without signs of 
greater readiness on the part of the players themselves.
146
 The final 
barrier results from the fact that MiLB teams are spread out across the 
country.
147
 ―The task of organizing a group of employees spread out 
across North America is a daunting task, as is servicing those 
employees.‖148 
Organizers and leaders like Marvin Miller do not appear on the scene 
very often. Garrett Broshuis believes that in order for there to be a 
                                                                                                             
141 Id. 
142 See id. (alterations to original); see also Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, 
SLATE (April 3, 2012) http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/04/minor_
league_union_thousands_of_pro_baseball_players_make_just_1_100_per_month_where
_is_their_c_sar_ch_vez_.html. (―The notion that these very young, inexperienced people 
were going to defy the owners, when they had stars in their eyes about making it to the 
major leagues—it [is] just not going to happen,‖ Miller says)(alteration to original). 
143 Lance Compa, Slumming in America, AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://prospect.org/article/slumming-america (alteration to original in quoted text). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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change there needs to be a bold person to take the helm and lead a drive 
for a labor union into MiLB.
149
 Nevertheless, no one has currently taken 
the initiative. Hence, the most plausible solution would be for a MLBPA 
to follow the Professional Hockey Players Association‘s precedent by 
encompassing its developmental league players. ― . . . [T]he Professional 
Hockey Players‘ Association represents approximately 1,600 minor 
league players across 64 teams throughout the American Hockey League, 
the East Coast Hockey league and the Central Hockey League which are 
the premier player development leagues for the National Hockey 
League.‖ 150 One would think that, because nearly every MLB player had 
to work their way through MiLB in order to achieve their success, 
members of the MLBPA would be anxious to include players that are 
currently going through the same sort of unfortunate situations that they 
had similarly gone through. But this is not the case. MLB players tend to 
feel that being in the minor leagues is a rite of passage and that ― . . . 
minor league players [should] wait their turn.‖151 
The MLBPA even goes as far as to negotiate with MLB regarding 
the rights of MiLB players. The 2014 season marked the beginning of a 
new collective bargaining agreement negotiated by MLB and the 
MLBPA.
152
 The agreement not only raised the minimum wage for MLB 
players to $500,000, but set new limits on bonuses paid to players 
drafted.
153
 So, although the MLBPA does not represent the newly drafted 
players, it retains the right to negotiate their bonuses.
154
 The hypocrisy in 
this is that MLB players, as members of the MLBPA, are negotiating to 
keep salaries and bonuses for MiLB players low, when they themselves 
went through the same process. But such is the business of baseball. As 
sports economist James Lambrinos states, ―Collective bargaining does 
[not] just pit owners against employees, sometimes it pits employees 
against other employees.‖155 In light of the fact that the average MLB 
                                                                                                             
149 See Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, SLATE (April 3, 2012) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/04/minor_league_union_thousands_
of_pro_baseball_players_make_just_1_100_per_month_where_is_their_c_sar_ch_vez_.h
tml (― . . . [U]nless some underpaid minor leaguer takes it upon himself to become the 
Cesar Chavez of baseball‖) (omission from original) (alteration to original). 
150 Harold Uhlman, Minor League Baseball—Is Financial Emancipation on the Way?, 
THINK BLUE LA, (March 15, 2014) http://www.thinkbluela.com/index.php/2014/0
3/15/minor-league-baseball-is-financial-emancipation-on-the-way/. 
151 DON WOLLET, GETTING ON BASE: UNIONISM IN BASEBALL 105 (2008) (alteration to 
original). 
152 Rothman, supra note 149. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 George Gmelch, Minor League Pay: Baseball‟s Antitrust Exemption Allows for 
Poverty Wages, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, (July 16, 2014), available at 
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player has spent four to six years in the minors,
156
 a greater level of 
solidarity should be expected. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the professional sports world has changed since the 
day baseball was granted an antitrust exemption. It is clear that MLB is 
no longer simply about the sport, it is about business. However, on the 
inside, MLB continues to use precedent set nearly 100 years ago to 
violate rights and laws and abuse its employees. The league was given an 
iron shield to protect itself from the Sherman Antitrust regime that 
governs every other industry in the country. Something needs to be done, 
especially in regards to the exploitative labor relations that characterize 
MiLB. However, there does not seem to be a light at the end of the 
tunnel. In order for there to be change, one of three things must happen: 
(1) Congress would need to strike down MLB‘s antitrust exemption, (2) 
a bold MiLB player, backed by a national union, must rally other players 
into the formation of a union, or (3) the MLBPA must either include all 
professional baseball players or at least fight for MiLB player rights. 
Until then, the monopolized industry of baseball will continue to grow in 
wealth at the expense of its employees. 
                                                                                                             
http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26155052/minor-league-pay-baseballs-
antitrust-exemption-allows-poverty). 
156 Based on the average age of position players in MLB being 24.4 years old; see Ben 
Lindbergh, Overthinking It Promoting Prospects, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Feb. 22, 2011) 
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=13018 
From 2005-2009, the average player making his major-league debut 
was 24.4 years old (taking the average of their seasonal ages). The 
average position player had 2070 minor-league plate appearances 
under his belt before he first stepped in against a major-league hurler; 
the average pitcher (without distinguishing between starters and 
relievers) had thrown 391 minor-league frames before getting his first 
crack at The Show. 
 
